Would you consider yourself more of a Rationalist (with Descartes) or an Empiricist (with Hume)? Be critical - what are the benefits and disadvantages of your position?
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9 comments:
I would definitely say that while I much appreciated the Descartes text, so far I'm more on the side of Hume on this one. Descartes was a geometer, and was definitely influenced by the fact that a triangle doesn't need to exist in reality for him to know things about it. If what Clara says is true - that Descartes believed that if he actually thought about it long enough, he could know just about anything - then Hume's view is more sensible.
Hume's argument that we never witness cause and effect, and that we can only make educated guesses about things based on experience, is consistent with what I notice - I continue to walk down the street with very little fear that I will be struck down by a thunderbolt, although that fear is always slightly present (anything can happen, you just don't dwell on worst-case scenarios). It is also consistent with what scientists now think about Quantum theory (Bertrand's Russell's comment).
Science is empirical - we can make a great number of computers and hydrogen bombs while still admitting elements of uncertainty. Our day-to-day lives are also empirical, which is why we never really know anything absolutely besides geometrical/mathematical facts. We just do our best, we make decisions based on what seems most sensible. And we are wrong a lot. It certainly sees like almost nothing can be reasoned out besides math itself, but math and reasoning does not apply to all possible knowledge, and if that's what Descartes ultimately believed was possible, I don't agree. The questions of existence, for example. These are daily questions, the contemplation of which does indeed impact our life choices. But of course, we all know that Descartes felt he proved God existed!
I think Descartes' view of reason is tied in with his unerring belief in God. He had no trouble with God as a first cause for everything. Hume's inconclusiveness on causes, for me, is more consistent with peoples' lack of knowledge and/or agreement about the first cause of the universe. We can still build spaceships - we can definitely do that - based on empirical knowledge of what we find around us, but ascribing causes to things is slippery, if you see what I mean. There is energy in the universe that seems to govern things, but we don't really know where it came from. But we can observe it. This is the best we can do, I think.
If I had to give a disadvantage to Hume's view - the view I prefer - is that for all my agreeing with him, there is a definite "dead-end" element to it (again, that idea I borrow somewhat from the Bertrand Russell text). You can't really know anything besides habitually - OK, so what next? Does this alter anything? Does this change our lives? I have to admit that to agree with Hume totally, you have to practically say "that's nice," and move on and pretend nothing happened!
Anyway, that's my blog entry for this week. I may or may not have any clue about what I'm saying.
oops, that wasn't short. Next time it will be, I swear.
If we can not base our undersatnding off of scientific "truth," or observable effects, then how are we to "know" anything? Hume's arguement that basically anything is possible, just not probable (a personal motto of mine), is basically not adhering to its own reasoning.
In tutorial, for example, we discussed how when we boil water, we don't really know that the water will boil, we assume that it will because we have observed this relationship and deduced, through reason, that if we place a pot of water over open flame, then it will boil. I suggest that Hume's position can be expressed in similar terms:
If we do not know, beyond all doubt (reasonable, or radical), that A always causes B, then everything we "know" is little more than assumptions.
Here, we can see a glaring problem. Hume has created a cyclical paradox. His reasoning to dismiss all assumptions is, in itself an assumption. We don't really know, beyond all doubt (reasonable or radical), that Hume's position is without exception. Yes, in the examples we talked about in class, there is always the possibility of an unpredicted outcome. However, can we say, beyond all doubt (reasonable or radical), that there is no causality which occurs 100% of the time? A "law" which maintains that A will always cause B? I mean, barring the possibility of Divine, Satanic, or deceptive intervention in a controlled and monitored experiment, can we not safely assume that if I put the water on the fire that the water will, eventually, boil? Furthermore, if something unpredictable does occur, using Hume's own logic, it is not worth our attention as the circumstance is so infintessimal that it may as well be dismissed.
In addition, a case could be made for each case, or our definitions of the conditions could be made more and more prescise as reason dictates. For example, we can start with the condition that A causes B, but if we come to a point that defies reason, we can refine our definition such that it the previous definition is a case of the case: I.e, we previous stated that "A causes B" and refine it to the conditions that "Under controlled circumstances X, Y, and Z, A causes B."
As for the relevance of either conclusion...I think we all know my stance on internal or external influences on a decision: They're pointless because we'll never really know why we act the way we do.
Matt M.
"If you're living in the United States of America today and you're not paranoid, you must be crazy."
Robert Anton Wilson.
> I mean, barring the possibility of Divine, Satanic, or deceptive intervention in a controlled and monitored experiment, can we not safely assume that if I put the water on the fire that the water will, eventually, boil? Furthermore, if something unpredictable does occur, using Hume's own logic, it is not worth our attention as the circumstance is so infintessimal that it may as well be dismissed.
>
Ah, but I think what Hume is getting at is not so much that there's an infinitesimal chance that something unlikely will intervene on your experiment - but that something simply unforeseen may occur. For example, you may boil water 100 times living in your log cabin on top of a mountain - and go camping somewhere else and not bring enough fuel to boil water every day, since it boils at a higher temperature at a lower altitude. I mean, how often do we 'reason' something out, beyond all of our doubt, to the absolute best of our ability - and then are blindsided by something we simply failed to take into account? This happens to me all the time! Too much!
And as to whether or not his argument creates a paradox - I'm not sure that's really the case. He argues that there's no way to be sure about anything in terms of cause and effect - that itself is not breaking his own rule, I don't think. He's negating the idea that you can definitely say "x causes y," but his negation of this does not itself say "x causes y." If you were to rephrase Hume as saying "Hume says we're never certain of anything, but he's certain of that!" Then yes, in that phrasing, he seems paradoxical. But I'm not sure that really undermines what he's accomplished with his Inquiry; you still can't speak of an instance in this reality - no matter how heavy-duty your microscope (or nuclear reactor) - where X *causes* Y, all the time, with no possible exceptions. His saying that does not itself give an instance of X causing Y, it's just a logical theory, a way of looking at things, a 'name' for something.
If we take the positions of Rationalism and Empiricism to be mutually exclusive then, I think, both are wrong.
In his chapter on Liberty and Necessity Hume argues, in a roundabout way, that whenever the conjunctive connections that we typically observe fail, we look for some source of the failure. For example, if I see what I believe to be a massive stone and, upon attempting to lift it, find that it is impossibly light, I will suspect something is terribly awry. It might turn out that the stone was in fact some clever special effect, made of Styrofoam or papier-mâché. As a result of an absence of knowledge, I had an expectation that was unwarranted concerning the consequence of my interaction with the stone.
Hume’s approach to the idea of causation is, it seems, based entirely on the perceptive subject, and as such he is right to claim that causation is in fact only conjunction. From the subject’s point of view, as we are all aware, no process of reasoning brought me to the conclusion that object A striking object B would lead to a pretty consistent pattern of motion for both A and B. Objectively, however, there is nothing precluding the notion that all effects will follow predictably from their causes in a CAUSAL, not conjunctive relationship. If a subject finds that his experience of the interaction between objects A and B is completely contrary to his past experience of the relationship between those two objects, his only consolation is that there was nothing preventing this from occurring. Objectively, though – ignoring, for a moment, the fact that Hume was addressing HUMAN UNDERSTANDING – there is some reason that objects A and B interacted in such a seemingly unpredictable way. This is knowable.
Let us take the example of the boiling water. I first suggest that almost every causal relationship is made up of a series of less extensive causal relationships. Between the subject’s decision to boil the water and the existence of boiling water there are many related causal relationships. This is clear if we consider the fact that there are certain criteria for the boiling of water – the subject has no right to be upset if his lukewarm heat-source failed to cause boiling. For each one of the criteria for boiling water – a container conducive to heart and capable of withstanding high temperatures, a substance that is in fact water, a source of heat that is capable of, within a reasonable amount of time, bringing water to a sufficient temperature, etc. – there are a series of smaller, more intricate instances of relation and causality (such as the process that actually takes place in water that allows it to boil). For water to boil, every one of these criteria must be met to some degree.
Having no reasonable justification as an Empiricist subject to suppose that there is any real causal connection between the application of heat to water and its subsequent boiling, I am resigned to the fact that, if the water doesn’t boil, this is just an unfortunate fluke. The reason it won’t boil, however, is not supernatural or outside of human knowledge. It simply requires an enquiry that combines the sensory evidence of our perceptive faculties in combination with the calculative talents of our rational faculty.
Hume and Descartes pay ample attention to the subject, but never attempt to reconcile the events of the real world with mental phenomena. The combination of the two philosophers might yield a better understanding of reality.
I would rather be on the side of empiricists at this time, though not completely. I think Hume is more realistic than Descartes, mostly because I think there is a limit for things we can know only by thinking. Also, Descartes’ argument on existence of God didn’t persuade me—I think he is rationalizing it from Christian perspectives. For example, Descartes argued that he proved existence of God saying that he has an innate idea of the perfect being, but for me it’s the idea of Christian God, as Professor Kingwell mentioned in the lecture. Many people who believe in religions other than Christianity or other monotheism (for example, Buddhism) do not even have an idea of a god, who is perfect, infinite, and the creator of everything.
The disadvantage of my position is that there is a question of mental phenomena, just like Ian says. In addition to that I think there are some ideas which are not “copies” of impressions or something that derives from our experiences, such as emotion and instinct.
<< Having no reasonable justification as an Empiricist subject to suppose that there is any real causal connection between the application of heat to water and its subsequent boiling, I am resigned to the fact that, if the water doesn’t boil, this is just an unfortunate fluke. The reason it won’t boil, however, is not supernatural or outside of human knowledge. It simply requires an enquiry that combines the sensory evidence of our perceptive faculties in combination with the calculative talents of our rational faculty.>>
Ah, but if you say that there is a reason that caused the water to boil/not boil, that you don't happen to know but is knowable - to what exact extent could you know it? You describe that there are certain criteria for the successful boiling: a container conducive to heart and capable of withstanding high temperatures, a substance that is in fact water, a source of heat that is capable of, within a reasonable amount of time, bringing water to a sufficient temperature, etc. - but what about that person at the wrong altitude? They have no clue what is happening. They thought they brought enough fuel. What happened? They failed to take into account atmospheric pressure.
That's because their knowledge of exactly what fire was, and how it worked, was not detailed enough. What Hume means, I think, is that it is totally impossible for us to know how things work to a degree of perfect specificity. All we can do is do trials - the water boils using the right amount of fuel 99 times, and this one time it doesn't - now we know why, we're at the wrong altitude. And that's all we can do, collect data like this. Because if we could truly *determine* the forces at work here - then we could do just about anything, science would be able to achieve anything just by reasoning and no empirical knowledge is necessary. But it is necessary - it's the only way we have of getting specific about the way things work, and it's the ONLY thing we can do, Hume argues. He didn't know this, but today, that's exactly what we think about the smallest particles we've found. They exhibit random behaviour, and we can not predict them with perfect accuracy, just high accurately on scales that are comparitively massive (compared to say electrons). Science has advanced a ways since Hume, and will continue to do so, but no God bestows in us the capacity to reason out everything perfectly, he would say, and on this, he's right. There are things we can't do, and never will do, since we can only observe, and have a finite amount of time and trials to do so in.
<< Hume and Descartes pay ample attention to the subject, but never attempt to reconcile the events of the real world with mental phenomena. The combination of the two philosophers might yield a better understanding of reality. >>
I would argue that Hume is simply an improvement on Descartes in terms of everyday reality, not a complete contradiction. Neither were unreasonable, both were advanced for their day, neither directly contradict sensible reality - Descartes was less advanced in my view, though, since he came earlier and was fixated on the Christian God (and other metaphysical things which may or may not exist but Hume rejects, quite reasonably). Both helped set up a system of science that was sensical.
Later in the book Hume talks left right and center about 'causes,' and does not need to bother mentioning 'oh yeah... and causes, we don't really know those certainly! Don't forget.' He knows that 'cause' is perfectly reasonable shorthand for observed phenomena. He simply gave the more metaphysical elements of earlier philosophers like Descartes a huge reality check by showing that we don't know the answer to the mysterious forces of the universe, and never will.
"but what about that person at the wrong altitude? They have no clue what is happening. They thought they brought enough fuel. What happened? They failed to take into account atmospheric pressure."
This is what I am getting at. Neither pure empiricism nor pure rationality could lead you to the recognition of atmospheric pressure, right? A combination of both will lead to an understanding of the reason your fire did not result from typical causes.
What I am suggesting is that if an effect doesn’t result from a cause in the way it is expected to, it is because the cause is misleading. The misleading cause in this case is the difference in atmospheric pressure.
"That's because their knowledge of exactly what fire was, and how it worked, was not detailed enough. What Hume means, I think, is that it is totally impossible for us to know how things work to a degree of perfect specificity. All we can do is do trials - the water boils using the right amount of fuel 99 times, and this one time it doesn't - now we know why, we're at the wrong altitude. And that's all we can do, collect data like this. Because if we could truly *determine* the forces at work here - then we could do just about anything, science would be able to achieve anything just by reasoning and no empirical knowledge is necessary. But it is necessary - it's the only way we have of getting specific about the way things work, and it's the ONLY thing we can do, Hume argues."
I agree with what you are saying here, for the most part. Though it can’t be taken as a universal law, I would merely suggest that on a reasonable level we understand the causes of things. Sure, small enough particles do have a tendency to behave erratically, but this has never been shown to produce an entirely erratic macroscopic entity – I doubt that anyone has ever seen a person fall apart pointlessly or suddenly shift his position by a hundred feet for no apparent reason.
So yes, absolutely, all we can do is observe, collect data, look towards causes etc.. I think this is a pretty good way of getting by. It has, after all, shown us those inconceivably small particles you speak of. I think empiricism is vital, but I just think that it isn’t the only thing. The process by which one comes to understand that atmospheric pressure is giving him the shaft in terms of fire-making is one that requires a rational consideration of empirical observations. Empiricism and Rationalism on their own do very little for you, I think.
I see myself as an empiricist rather than a rationalist, though if it were an option, I would rather be a rational empiricist. Though, having to be one or the other, I would have to choose empiricism. Rationalism has too many flaws for me. Nothing can compares to the actual experience of something, not even thinking about doing something, that would lead to such an empty life. I would rather learn the hard way, by getting shocked when sticking a knife in the electric socket. I would prefer that to sitting in front of the socket wondering if. There are too many possibilities one must consider, of course, avoiding doing stupid stuff like sticking a knife into the electric socket is where rationalism would come in handy, but for the lack of a better example, I have to stick to. The ability to learn from experiences is what gives us our knowledge; we can only use our reason to predict certain outcomes based on passed outcomes to similar events. I believe that rationalism needs empiricism, without it, rationalism would be lost, there are far too many possibilities to be sure of anything, unless you try it.
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